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RECORD PIRACY AND MODERN PROBLEMS OF
INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES AND
BRITISH COPYRIGHT LAWS*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most deeply rooted problems in the United States and
British copyright law is the question of how to treat the "innocent in-
fringer,"' the person who infringes unknowingly or without reason to
suspect that he is infringing. Historically, both Congress and Parlia-
ment have regarded special treatment for such infringers with ambiva-
lence, and United States and British copyright law reflects this
confusion. Each has at one time or another provided the innocent in-
fringer with total immunity from liability, remedial relief, or no protec-
tion whatsoever.
The problem of innocent infringement has been revived by the
record 2 piracy crisis gripping the American and British music indus-
tries. Because of the severe impact record piracy has had on music
industry profits, copyright owners3 in musical works4 and sound re-
* © Copyright Frank L. Fine 1980.
1. For a thorough overview of the subject, see A. Latman and W. Tager, Liability of
Innocent Infringers of Copyrights, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PAT-
ENTS. TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, No. 25,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Latman]. See also Yankwich, Intent
and Related Problems in Plagiarism, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 233 (1960); M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
2. When used herein, "record" denotes conventional records and tapes. Under the
United States Copyright Act of 1976 [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act], the term of art for
"record" is "phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) defines "phonorecords" as "material
objects in which sounds ... are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." The equivalent term of art under the
British Copyright Act of 1956 [hereinafter cited as 1956 Act] is the term "record," which is
defined as "any disc, tape. . . or other device in which sounds are embodied so as to be
capable (with or without the aid of some other instrument) of being automatically repro-
duced therefrom. ... 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 48.
3. The 1976 Act defines "copyright owner" indirectly. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states
that "'copyright owner', with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copy-
right refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976) adds that
"[c]opyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work." Likewise, under the 1956 Act, "the author of a work shall be entitled to any copy-
right subsisting in the work .. " 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 4(1).
4. The 1976 Act does not specifically define "work" or "musical work." To be copy-
rightable, an "original work of authorship" must be "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
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cordings5 may no longer file lawsuits primarily against the pirates.6
There is evidence that copyright owners will litigate against sellers of
pirated (or counterfeit) records with greater frequency.
For example, in the United States, the Recording Industry Associ-
ation of America (RIAA) has used the mass media to drum up senti-
ment against the National Association of Recording Merchandisers
(NARM). A popular American magazine recently published RIAA
warnings to NARM that it will vigorously pursue civil actions for max-
imum damages against retailers who sell counterfeit records.7 The
RIAA defends its litigious rhetoric by citing a study that it conducted,
in which investigators allegedly found counterfeit merchandise in
ninety percent of the 500 retail outlets checked.8 The RIAA claims that
pression, now known or later developed, from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated .. " 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). "Works of authorship include
the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." Id. (emphasis added). The 1956 Act does not
define "work" or "musical work." However, the Musical Copyright Act of 1902, which was
repealed upon passage of the 1956 Act, defined a "musical work" as "any combination of
melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to writing or otherwise graphically
produced or reproduced." R.F. WHALE, COPYRIGHT (1971) at 38 [hereinafter cited as
WHALE]. See also COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 172 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as COPINGER].
5. Congress created a copyright for owners of sound recordings in 1971. Act of Octo-
ber 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § (f), 85 Stat. 391 [amending 17 U.S.C. § I (repealed
1976)]. The 1976 Act defines "sound recordings" as "works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds. . . regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as discs, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976). The 1956 Act defines a "sound recording" as "the aggregate of the sounds
embodied in, and capable of being reproduced by means of, a record of any descrip-
tion. . . ." 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 12(9).
6. A sampling of the record piracy litigation directed against pirates includes: A & M
Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978); Pickwick Music Corp.
v. Record Prods., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Beechwood Music Corp. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
8 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); and Reeve Music Co. v. Crest Records, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.N.Y.
1959). In contrast, only a handful of reported cases involve vendor liability for the sale of
infringing records. See Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rel"d, Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957) (large record dealer); Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (department store chain); Harms
Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.Cal. 1958) (department store chain).
7. At the annual meeting of the National Association of Recording Merchandisers in
March 1980, Stanley Gortikov, president of the Recording Industry Association of America,
reportedly warned the retailers that "if you buy or sell counterfeits, we shall do everything
possible not only to encourage maximum criminal penalties, but also maximum civil dam-
ages. We wantyou to hurt, badly." ROLLING STONE, May 15, 1980 at 28 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
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such a proliferation of counterfeit product in the retail community
could not occur without the retailers' knowledge that they are dealing
in infringing records.9
Zealously seeking relief against the infringing retailer, the RIAA
has overlooked a more likely explanation for its incredible ninety
percent finding. As the president of one large record chain has ob-
served, counterfeit records would not circulate in most retail outlets if
the records did not defy detection by the retailers involved. '0 Contrary
to the RIAA's position, if there is widespread retailer involvement in
counterfeit sales, many infringing retailers may be innocent.
The current dispute between the RIAA and NARM is a modem
reenactment of the historical conflict between copyright owners and in-
nocent infringers. Copyright owners have traditionally claimed that in-
junctive and monetary relief should be available against all who
commercially exploit an infringing work, including those who deal in
unauthorized copies" of an infringing work. Conversely, persons who
deal as a matter of course in copies of works that are copyrightable
claim that they should be provided a defense of innocence.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and compare the historical
and current treatment of innocent infringers under the United States
and British copyright laws. In light of the growing danger of suits
against record retailers, some emphasis will be given to the treatment of
retailers who innocently sell counterfeit records.
It is asserted that the United States Copyright Act of 1976 (1976
Act) does not adequately reconcile the just concerns of copyright own-
ers and innocent infringers. It gives copyright owners the right to in-
junctive relief against exploitation of infringing works as well as a right
to defendant's profits or unjust enrichment-regardless of the in-
fringer's innocence. However, the Act also allows the recovery of ac-
tual damages against the innocent infringer, which, in combination
with the other remedies, effectively shifts the copyright owner's risk of
9. Id.
10. ROLLING STONE, April 17, 1980 at 27.
11. The 1976 Act defines "copies" as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis added). The 1956 Act does
not define "copy" per se, but does define an infringing copy. An "infringing copy," with
respect to literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work "means a reproduction otherwise than
in the form of a cinematograph film [and] in relation to a sound recording, means a record
embodying that recording. . . ." 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 18(3)(a)-(b). When used herein,
"copy" denotes the reproduction of any work, including a sound recording, in the form of
records or other material objects.
1981]
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loss to the infringer. Whenever. the innocent .infringer is compelled to
pay the copyright owner's actual damages, the infringer insures the
owner against losses attributable to exploitation of unauthorized cop-
ies.
It is also asserted that the "strict liability" approach of the 1976
Act toward innocent infringers is unjustifiable. There is no persuasive
public policy that requires a shift of the copyright owner's risk of loss to
the innocent infringer, and particularly not to the record retailer.
Moreover, the availability of actual damages, no matter how slight,
may unnecessarily burden the infringer's First Amendment interest in
disseminating artistic, literary, and musical works to the public.
In contrast to the 1976 Act, the British Copyright Act of 1956
(1956 Act) strikes a sensitive balance between the copyright owner's
desire to prevent the commercial exploitation of unauthorized copies
and the need to protect innocent infringers. The 1956 Act provides that
if the infringer can prove his innocence, the copyright owner's remedies
include injunctive relief and the infringer's profits, but not actual dam-
ages.
II. RECORD PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
In the last ten years, record piracy has become an enormously lu-
crative business. In 1971, a House Report stated that at that time the
annual -volume of business conducted by record pirates in the United
States exceeded $100 million.' 2 Recent estimates indicate that record
piracy costs the American record industry more than $400 million an-
nually, 13 compared with annual legal sales of $3.5 billion.' 4 It may be
that the current record industry slump is largely attributable to coun-
terfeit sales.
A. Relieffor Copyright Owners
Under the 1976 Act, copyright owners in musical works and sound
recordings who are victimized by record piracy (generally music pub-
lishers and record companies, respectively) 5 can obtain relief in sev-
12. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
13. TIME, March 10, 1980 at 70.
14. NEw YORKER, April 16, 1979 at 31.
15. Although the "author" of a musical work is originally its composer, ownership of the
work is usually assigned to a music publisher. The 1976 Act provides that "ownership of a
copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance. . . ." 17
U.S.C. §201(d)(l) (1976). See 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 36 for the British equivalent to
§ 201(d)(l). The 1976 Act also provides that a sound recording may be protected by copy-
right. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976). The initial owner of the copyright in a sound recording is
[Vol. I
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eral ways.
First, the copyright owner may file an infringement action against
the record pirate himself 6 The Act provides that the duplication of a
sound recording in the form of records for public distribution without
the permission of the copyright owner of the sound recording is action-
able as an infringement of the owner's copyright. 7 Likewise, if the
pirate fails to pay the required compulsory license fees to the copyright
owner of the musical work embodied in the duplicated sound record-
ing, such conduct constitutes infringement of the rights of the copyright
owner of the musical work."8 Neither copyright owner must prove an
its "author," Id. § 201(a) (1976), or in other words, the maker of the recording. Record
companies are frequently the copyright owner of sound recordings released to the public in
the form of records because the sound recordings are usually financed by and recorded
under the supervision of record manufacturers. Under the 1956 Act, "[clopyright shall sub-
sist.., in every sound recording of which the maker was a qualified person ... " 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, c.74, § 12(l) (emphasis added).
16. As of January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Act) common law copyright was
preempted. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976) provides that "all legal or equitable rights that are the
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright," including
rights in musical works and sound recordings, are governed exclusively by the 1976 Act.
After January 1, 1978, "no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State." Id. (emphasis added). Thq words
"equivalent right" should not be interpreted in the sense of substantively equal protection
under common law and Federal statute. "As long as a work fits within one of the general
subject matter categories . . . the bill prevents the States from protecting it .. " H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976), "even if the precise contours of the right
differ. . . ." NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 2.01[B]. It is therefore highly questionable that
common law copyright in the form of conversion will survive in the United States. How-
ever, the 1976 Act provides that "[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before February
15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be
annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2047." 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976). On
preemption, see Note, The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 206-14
(1978). The 1956 Act also abolishes common law copyright. With the exception of univer-
sity, Crown copyright, and rules of equity, "no copyright, or right in the nature of copyright,
shall subsist otherwise than by virtue of this Act .. " 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 46(5). See also
Aldous, The Philosophy Behindthe English Copyright Law, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 302,
305 and COPINGER, supra note 4, at §§ 21-44.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976) provides that "[t]he exclusive right[s] of the owner of copy-
right in a sound recording [include] the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of
phonorecords .. " See generally, Meyers, Sound Recordings and the New Copyright Act,
22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 573 (1977) reprinted in THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE NEW CoPy-
RIGHT LAW (N.Y. Law School L. Rev. ed. 1977). 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) provides that
"[ajnyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.., is an infringer
of the copyright." The 1956 Act provides that "[t]he acts restricted by the copyright in a
sound recording [include] making a record embodying the recording. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2,
c.74, § 12(5)(a).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976) provides that "[w]hen phonorecords of a nondramatic
musical work have been distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of
the copyright owner, any other person may, by complying with the provisions of this section,
1981]
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intent to infringe in order to establish an infringement.' 9
The 1976 Act also provides that copyright owners in musical
works and sound recordings may sue vendors in an infringement action
for the sale of counterfeit records.2" As with the record pirate, the Yen-
obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(b)(1) (1976) provides that "[alny person who wishes to obtain a compulsory license
... shall . . . serve notice of intention to do so on the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(b)(2) (1976) provides that "[flailure to serve or file the notice required by clause (1)
forecloses the possibility of a compulsory license and, in the absence of a negotiated license,
renders the making and distribution of phonorecords actionable as acts of infringement
under section 501 .. " For the British analogue to § 115, see § 8(l) of the 1956 Act.
19. The often cited rule is that "[ilntention to infringe is not essential under the Act."
Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (Brandeis, J.).
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 2(5)(a) provides that "[tihe acts restricted by the copyright in a...
musical work [include] reproducing the work in any material form ... " See also
§ 12(5)(a) supra note 17. Under the 1956 Act, the state of mind of the pirate is relevant only
to the remedies available to the copyright owner and not to the question of infringement. 4
& 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 17(2)(a)-(b) provide that "[w]here in an action for infringement of copy-
right it is proved or admitted-(a) that an infringement was committed, but (b) that at the
time of the infringement the defendant was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for
suspecting, that copyright subsisted in the work or other subject-matter to which the action
relates, the plaintiff shall not be entitled under this section to any damages against the de-
fendant in respect of the infringement, but shall be entitled to an account of profits .. "
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1976) provides that the copyright owner of a musical work has
the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership. . . ." The House Report adds that "any un-
authorized public distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would
be an infringement." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976). The copyright
owner of a sound recording may assert the same right of distribution against a vendor of
unauthorized phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976). For a general background on
vendor liability for the sale of unauthorized phonorecords, see Note, Copyright: Liability of
Seller of UnlicensedPhonograph Record, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 621 (1958). Under the 1956 Act,
copyright owners of musical works and sound recordings have rights parallel to those pro-
vided by the 1976 Act. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 5(3)(a) provides that "[t]he copyright in a...
musical.. . work is infringed by any person who, in the United Kingdom, or in any other
country to which this section extends, and without the license of the owner of the copy-
right-(a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire any article
...if to his knowledge the making of the article constituted an infringement of that copy-
right, or (in the case of an imported article) would have constituted an infringement of that
copyright if the article had been made in the place into which it was imported." The 1956
Act gives copyright owners of sound recordings the same right against vendors that owners
in musical works enjoy under the Act. However, unlike the 1976 Act, the 1956 Act provides
that owners of sound recordings have a cause of action against vendors of unauthorized
copies not in the form of records. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 16(3)(a) provides that the copyright in
a sound recording is infringed by any person who "(a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade
offers or exposes for sale or hire any article. . . if to his knowledge the making of the article
constituted an infringement .. " (emphasis added).
The impact of the 1976 Act and the 1956 Act on vendors of unauthorized records may
be modified by international agreement. The United States and Great Britain are parties to
the Universal Copyright Convention, which provides that published and unpublished works
of nationals of each contracting State shall enjoy in every other contracting State the same
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dor's intent to infringe is irrelevant in establishing the infringement.2
B. The Problem of Direct and Indirect Infringement
The record pirate and the infringing record retailer are two differ-
ent types of infringer. The pirate is a "direct" infringer--one who cre-
ates an infringing product for commercial purposes. Like the copyist
who appropriates another's literary or artistic work as his own, the rec-
ord pirate is a deliberate or willing infringer.22 In the words of Justice
protection as that other State accords to works of its nationals. Universal Copyright Con-
vention, Geneva Text, September 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324. See also Paris
Text, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. The Geneva and Paris texts went
into force in the United States on September 16, 1955 and July 10, 1974, respectively. These
texts went into force in the United Kingdom on September 27, 1957 and July 10, 1974,
respectively. See general,, A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL
CONVENTION (3d ed. 1972). The United States and Great Britain are also parties to the
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms, which obligates each con-
tracting State to protect producers against the importation of unauthorized records. Con-
vention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication
of their Phonograms, October 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, T.I.A.S. No. 7808. However, the
Convention left open the means of implementing its mandate to each contracting State.
21. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 334 U.S. 228, 229 (1952) (held, in
action for infringement based on sale of infringing statuettes, innocence of seller was irrele-
vant: "Unbeknown to Woolworth, these dogs have been copied from respondent's and by
marketing them it became an infringer") (Jackson, J.) (emphasis added); Harms, supra note 6
(department store chain held liable for sale of infringing records, court citing above quota-
tion with approvals; McCulloch v. Zapun Ceramics, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(infringing figurines). In contrast, under the 1956 Act, the copyright owner in a musical or
sound recording does not establish an infringement against the vendor unless "to his knowl-
edge the making of the article constituted an infringement of that copyright. ... 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, c.74, §§ 5(3)(a) and 16(3)(a). Knowledge in this context means actual, not construc-
tive knowledge. Knowledge could nonetheless be imputed when the average vendor would
have knowledge, unless the vendor can refute this inference with contrary evidence. R.C.A.
Corp. v. Custom Cleared Sales Pty. [1978] F.L.R. 576 (Supr. Ct. N.S.W.) (interpreting the
Australian copyright statute, which is an adaptation of the 1956 Act).
22. "Record pirates or 'diskleggers' as they have been called, are manufacturers who re-
record or 'dub' recordings made by legitimate companies and sell them competitively. In
this manner, they avoid having to pay the performers for their time, and they have the
benefit of the initial recording company's talents in getting the finest rendition possible. Or-
dinarily, they also omit payment of the copyright, although, as far as the copyright law is
concerned, even a pirate has the right to record copyrighted musical compositions provided
he files notice of intent and pays the royalties." Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176, 180 n. 4
(Kaufman, J.) (emphasis added). For a general background on record piracy, see Note,
Piracy on Records, 5 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1953). The modus operandi of the counterfeiter is
illustrated in the following account by a record company executive: "Atlantic Recording
Corporation paid approximately $80,000 to record an album by Crosby, Stills and Nash,
and then another $20,000 to advertise and promote the album. Atlantic's costs for manufac-
tured discs and pre-recorded tapes of the album exceeded $600,000. It is just at this point-
after the record company has invested enormous sums of money on a high-quality album,
produced a hit and achieved wide market popularity--that the pirate swoops in to reap the
19811
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Blackburn, "in almost every case, a man who copies a work without the
authority of the owner must know that he is pirating the work of some-
body."23
In contrast to the record pirate, the vendor of infringing records is
an "indirect" or "secondary" infringer--one who infringes in the
course of dealing in products that are within the scope of copyright.24
Because of the possibility of innocent infringement inherent in a secon-
dary involvement with illegal records or copies, United States copy-
right law has historically singled out such infringers for special
treatment.
III. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT INFRINGERS
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Absolute Immunity
The adoption of the Copyright Clause of the United States Consti-
tution in 1787 was intended by the Framers to abolish the existing prac-
tice of applying to each state for a copyright.25 The Copyright Clause
was the first step in creating a copyright that would be effective in all of
the states. The Clause empowered Congress "[t]o promote the progress
of science and usable arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover-
ies."
The "exclusive right" contemplated by the Copyright Clause was a
"restraint upon trade, "26 a concept not favored by the free market sys-
tem. But over 100 years after the Clause was adopted, the United
States Supreme Court confirmed the purpose of the Clause in similar
direct language. InAmerican Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,27 the Court
said that "the purpose of the copyright law [is] to secure a monopoly
• . . of the result of the inventor's thought."2
An important question for Congress as it drafted the first federal
copyright law was how many exclusive rights should be conferred on
authors and inventors. Would copyright owners be limited to causes of
benefits at little or no expense." S. SHEMEL AND M.W. KRASILOVSKY. THIS BUSINESS OF
Music 94 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as SHEMEL].
23. Ex Parte Beal, L.R. 3 Q.B. 387 (1868) (Blackburn, J.).
24. See WHALE, supra note 4, at 85; COPINGER, supra note 4, at § 401; and J.M. CAVEN-
DISH, A HANDBOOK OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITISH PUBLISHING PRACTICE 44 (1974).
25. E.S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 88 (1879).
26. J. TAUBMAN, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST 7 (1960).
27. 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
28. Id. at 293 (Day, J.).
[Vol. I
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action against plagiarists and copyists, or would owners be permitted to
sue users in the commercial world as well? Some sanctions had to be
provided against users to deter commercial exploitation of infringing
products. But what if a plagiarist submitted his manuscript to a pub-
lisher who was unable to determine whether a protected work had been
pirated? Or what if a shopkeeper were sold a box of maps that were
copied from another's protected map, and the shopkeeper had no rea-
son to suspect that the maps were pirated copies? Were such innocent
publishers and shopkeepers to be treated the same way as the plagiarist
and copyist?
The United States Copyright Act of 179029 (1790 Act) was the first
federal copyright statute to create a distinction between direct and indi-
rect infringement, in recognition of the need to protect honest business-
men who deal in works that are copyrightable. Section 2 of the Act
provided that once a map, chart or book has been published, if any
person other than the author "shall print, reprint, publish, or import
• ..any copies without the consent of the author or proprietor. . . or
knowing the same to be so printed, reprinted, or imported, shall publish,
sell, or expose to sale [the same] without such consent. ,-3o such per-
son shall be liable for damages.
There were several problems inherent in Section 2 of the 1790 Act.
First, the implementation of safeguards for innocent indirect infringers
was not consistent. Publishers and vendors were protected, but printers
and importers were not. Moreover, if a publisher or vendor did not
knowingly infringe, he suffered no liability whatsoever. The copyright
owner could not obtain an injunction against or recover profits from
the innocently infringing publisher or seller.
The United States Copyright Act of 187031 (1870 Act) perpetuated
the deficiencies of Section 2 of the 1790 Act by discriminating between
classes of indirect infringers and by insulating the protected class from
all liability. Under the 1870 Act, the innocently infringing vendor re-
tained total immunity from liability, but the infringing publisher be-
came liable notwithstanding his innocence.32
B. The 1909 4ct: A Short-Lived Remedial Approach
Under the United States Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), print-
ers, publishers, vendors, and (by amendment in 1947) importers could
29. Act of May 31, 1790, ch, 15, 1 Stat. 124.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
32. Id. §§ 99 and 100.
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be liable for infringement, regardless of their innocence.33
The former approach of absolute immunity, which characterized
the 1790 and 1870 Acts, was replaced by a new remedial scheme.
Section 25(b) provided that infringers would be subject to an in-
junction and liable for:
[S]uch damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered
due to the infringement as well as all the profits which the
infringer shall have made .. .or in lieu of actual damages
and profits such damages as to the court shall appearjust ...
[not to] exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of
$250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty.34
On its face, the statutory damages clause of Section 25(b) appeared
to provide a mechanism that would prevent recovery of actual damages
against the innocent infringer. The trial court appeared to have discre-
tion to weigh various factors in making an award, including the in-
fringer's innocence. However, the very authorization of judicial
fairness was construed to eliminate its application to innocent infring-
ers.
1. Douglas v. Cunningham: Section 25(b) Was Intended to Protect
the Copyright Owner.
In the controversial 1935 case of Douglas v. Cunningham,35 the
United States Supreme Court reversed a First Circuit decision which
had reduced the copyright owner's statutory award (recovered from an
innocently infringing newspaper publisher) from $5,000 to $250. In
reaching its decision, the Court turned the plain language of Section
25(b) on its head. The Court held that the purpose of the statutory
damages provision was "to give the owner of a copyright some recom-
pense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law render diffi-
cult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits."
36
Douglas stood for a second proposition: the trial court had discre-
tion to award actual damages and profits, unless they were difficult or
impossible to ascertain. In the latter event, statutory damages were
mandatory.37
33. § l(a) of the United States Copyright Act of 1909 (hereinafter cited as the 1909 Act]
simply provided that the copyright owner shall have the exclusive right "ft]o print, reprint,
publish, copy and vend the.copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1909).
34. Id. § 25(b) (1909) (emphasis added).
35. 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
36. Id. at 209.
37. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1979); Pye v.
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When statutory damages were not appropriate, there remained the
question of whether the trial courts could award actual damages and
profits cumulatively. This aspect of Douglas resulted in a split among
jurisdictions. A number of courts followed the Congressional mandate
that either damages or profits should be awarded, whichever is
greater.38 But other courts held that the express language of Section
25(b) authorized cumulative recovery. 39 This latter result effectively
shifts the copyright owner's risk of loss to the innocent infringer.
The latitude given by the Douglas Court to trial judges when stat-
utory damages were appropriate was potentially far more dangerous to
innocent infringers than the cumulative recovery of actual damages
and profits. If the copyright owner was provided with a sympathetic
judge, the owner could obtain an inordinate award of statutory dam-
ages by failing to prove actual damages or profits. In its discretion, the
court could manipulate its "best estimate" of the undetermined dam-
ages or profits to give the copyright owner a higher award than he
could otherwise obtain. This possibility became a reality in F W. Wool-
worth v. Contemporary Arts, Inc. 40
2. Douglas as Applied to an Innocently Infringing Vendor: The
Copyright Owner's Discretion to Penalize the Infringer.
Innocently infringing vendors as well as publishers suffered under
the Douglas analysis of Section 25(b). The power of the courts to ig-
nore the vendor's innocence is most apparent in the 1952 Woolworth
case.
In Woolworth, the defendant department store chain purchased
127 dozen dog statuettes from an Ohio manufacturer, then resold them
at a retail price of $1.19. Woolworth did not know that the ceramic
models it purchased were inferior infringing copies of a statuette manu-
factured by the plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation. At trial, plaintiff
Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Krofft]; and Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1966).
38. The House Report to the 1909 Act suggested an alternative recovery of "one or the
other. . . whichever is greater." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1909). See
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1940); Gordon v. Weir,
I I l F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D.Mich. 1953), af'd, 216 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954); Krofft, supra
note 37, at 1174-75. See also HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW 169 (rev. ed. A. Latman 1962).
39. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) and Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 132
U.S.P.Q. 30. 35 (N.D.Ill. 1961), aft'd, 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963), cerl. denied, 373 U.S. 913
(1963).
40. 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
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"made no effort ' ' I to prove its actual damages and defendant's profits.
The defendant, however, admitted gross profits of $899.16 and, on ap-
peal, tried to limit the award to this amount.42 The First Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's award of $5,000, the maximum allowed by
Section 101(b) (the codified successor of Section 25(b)),43 citing Doug-
las as the controlling authority. This holding was not disturbed by the
United States Supreme Court on certiorari.
In his powerful dissent, Justice Black pointed out the grotesque
result that the Court had achieved in its reliance on Douglas: "[H]ere
the trial judge gave judgment for statutory damages in an amount that
smacks ofpunitive qualities. And this Court has held that the amount
of such damages is committed to the unreviewable discretion of a trial
judge."' Black urged the Court to "heed the admonition. . . that the
object of § 101(b) is not to inflict punishment but to award an injured
copyright owner that which in fairness is his 'and nothing beyond
this.' ,45
3. The Congressional Response to Section 25(b).
Congressional advocates of safeguards for innocent indirect in-
fringers have reacted bitterly to Section 25(b) from the time it became
law. Between 1924 and 1940, fourteen bills were submitted to Congress
specifically providing that the innocent infringer should be insulated
from all liability or from the imposition of damages. 6
In 1946, Congress finally acknowledged that innocent indirect in-
fringers merited special protection. However, such protection was ex-
tended to innocent indirect infringers of trademarks, not infringers of
copyright. Section 1114(2) of the Lanham Act47 provided that printers
and publishers who innocently infringed trademarks would not be lia-
ble for damages or profits.48 Innocent indirect infringers of copyright
41. 193 F.2d 162, 168 (1st Cir. 1952) (Woodbury, J.) (emphasis added).
42. ld. at 167; 344 U.S. at 23 1.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1947); see 193 F.2d at 167.
44. 344 U.S. at 236 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 235 (quoting from Sheldon, supra note 38, at 399).
46. See LATMAN, supra note 1, at 149-52.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1946).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1962) provides that "(a) Where an infringer is engaged solely in
the business of printing the mark for others and establishes that he was an innocent infringer
the owner of the right infringed .hall be entitled as against such infringer only to an injunc-
tion against future printing; (b) where the infringement complained of is contained in or is
part of paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical the
remedies of the owner of the right infringed as against the publisher or distributor shall be
confined to an injunction against the presentation'of such advertising matter in future issues
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remained subject to the strictures of Section 25(b), as it was construed
in Douglas.
The lack of safeguards for innocent indirect infringers of copyright
has remained a topic of great concern to commentators. In 1958,
Professors Latman and Tager submitted a comprehensive reappraisal
of the problem of innocent infringement to the Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights.4 9 They contend that:
The problems common to a particular group, such as vendors,
printers [and] periodical publishers may call for special treat-
ment [but that] the remedial problems may be more signifi-
cant than the general question of liability. In other words,
state of mind might be considered irrelevant to the question of
infringement, but might be determinative of the remedies avail-
able against the infringer.:
The ambiguity of the statutory damages clause of Section 25(b)
resulted in judicial manipulation of its language against the innocent
infringer. If the infringer's innocence were "determinative" of the
availability of damages against him, as Latman and Tager appear to
contemplate, the judicial fiat would probably have not occurred.
IV. TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS UNDER THE 1976 ACT
Continuing the approach of the 1909 Act, the United States Copy-
right Act of 1976 makes a tripartite remedial scheme available to copy-
right owners-injunctive relief,"' actual damages and profits,5 2 and
statutory damages. 3
In language similar to that of Section 25(b), clause (1) of Section
504(c) (the statutory damages provision) states that: "Except as pro-
vided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect at
any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages. . . in a sum of
not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just."
Clause (2) of Section 504(c) was "the subject of extensive discus-
... Pro rided That these limitations shall apply only to innocent infringers. (emphasis
following "Prorided" added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1946) (injunctive relief) and § I 117
(1975) (actual damages and profits).
49. Latman, supra note 1.
50. Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976).
52. Id. § 504(a) & (b) (1976).
53. Id. § 504(a) & (c) (1976).
54. Id. § 504(c) (1976).
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sion" S in the Congressional hearings because it contains the "'inno-
cent infringer' provision" 6 of the Act. The clause provides:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an in-
fringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce
the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than
$100." 7
The House Report adds the necessary interpretive gloss to clause
(2) of Section 504(c):
The basic principle underlying this provision is that the courts
should be given discretion to. . . lower the minimum [statu-
tory damages] where the infringer is innocent. . . . The 'in-
nocent infringer' provision. . . which would allow reduction
of minimum statutory damages to $100 is sufficient to protect
against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated
innocent infringement, and it offers adequate insulation to
users . . . who are particularly vulnerable to this type of in-
fringement suit.58
Despite Congress's ostensible commitment to protect users such
as retailers, printers, and publishers against liability, it seriously under-
mined the thrust of Section 504(c)(2) in several ways.
A. The Copyright Owner May Elect Actual Damages
The question of whether an innocent infringer may be liable for
the exceptional statutory amount of $100 is not totally within the
court's discretion. Unless the copyright owner elects statutory dam-
ages, the court is without authority to take into account the infringer's
innocence in making an award. The House Report indicates that this
election is mandatory. The' Report plainly states that "[r]ecovery of
actual damages and profits. . . or of statutory damages under section
504(c) is alternative and/or the copyright owner to elect."59
If the copyright owner elects actual damages and profits rather
than statutory damages, he may obtain cumulative relief. Section
504(a)(1) provides that the copyright owner may obtain his "actual
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1976).
56. Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1976) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
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damages and any additional profits of the infringer .... ,60
The House Report states that actual damages and profits each
have a remedial function: "Damages are awarded to compensate the
copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are
awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly beneiting from a wrong-
ful act."'6 ' It follows that if the copyright owner elects actual damages
and profits against an innocent infringer, Section 504 in effect, shifts the
owner's risk of loss to the innocent infringer.
B. The Election of Statutory Damages- Douglas Revived
Congress also watered down the innocent infringer provision of
Section 504(c)(2) in the event the copyright owner elects statutory dam-
ages. The very language of Section 504(c)(2) makes the reduction dis-
cretionary, stating that if the court finds the infringer innocent, it "may
reduce the award" to $100; the court is not compelled by Section
504(c)(2) to reduce the copyright owner's award to $100.62 And if the
court decides not to lower the minimum from $250 to $100, Section
504(c)(1) states that the court may award damages "in a sum of not less
than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers jUSt.' 63 The
House Report is silent as to whether Section 504(c)(1) is even applica-
ble in a case of innocent infringement. But as we learned in our analy-
sis of Section 25(b), it was precisely this ambiguous language ofjudicial
fairness that allowed the Douglas Court to construe the provision
against the innocent infringer.
To prevent any misconception of the purpose of the judicial fair-
ness provision of Section 504(c)(1), Congress asserts that the doctrine of
Douglas is still in force. The House Report states that "there is nothing
in section 504 [this section] to prevent a court from taking account of
evidence concerning actual damages andprofits in making an award of
statutory damages within the range set out in subsection (c)." 64
This review of Section 504(c)(1) and (2) suggests that if the copy-
right owner elects statutory damages, the court would not abuse its dis-
cretion if it awarded its best estimate of his actual damages and
defendant's profits. Therefore, regardless of whether the copyright
owner elects actual damages and profits or statutory damages, the court
may shift the copyright owner's risk of loss to the innocent infringer.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976) (emphasis added).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 504(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
64. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976) (emphasis added).
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The historical justification for making actual damages available
against the innocent infringer consists of two arguments: (1) that copy-
right infringement is analogous to the tort of conversion, and (2) that
unlike the copyright owner, the innocent infringer is in a position to
guard against the infringement by making diligent inquiry or by ob-
taining indemnity or insurance.
C The Analogy to Conversion and DeA costa
In the classic case of DeAcosta v. Brown,6 Judge Clark, writing for
the majority of the Second Circuit panel, said that the view that "dam-
age should be limited to such as can be foreseen. . . does not apply to
conversion. "66 He argued that because copyright infringement is
analogous to conversion,67 a copyright owner should be able to obtain
actual damages against an innocent indirect infringer. Applying
Clark's logic, the Court of Appeal held that a magazine publisher who
indirectly infringed by publishing excerpts from an infringing book-
though the lower court found him innocent-was liable for actual dam-
ages.
Judge Learned Hand, dissenting, agreed with Clark's analogy of
copyright infringement to conversion, but argued that the intent re-
quired to commit a conversion is absent in the case of innocent indirect
infringement:
[I]t is true that if, for instance, I carry off as mine another's
watch in my bag, it is no excuse that I think it mine. How-
ever, I do not convert it, whatever acts of dominion I exercise
over my bag, ifI do not know, or am not chargeable with notice,
that there is a watch in the bag, though I may have equally
denied the owner's right.68
Hand analogized the general common law rule of the intent neces-
sary to convert to the case of an indirect infringement. Dean Prosser
sums up the rule: "A conversion can result only from conduct intended
65. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944).
66. Id. at 412.
67. It has been generally held that copyright infringement is a tort. See. e.g., Turton v.
United States, 212 F.2d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 1954). Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young. 138 F.2d 972. 975
(7th Cir. 1943); Vitagraph. Inc. v. Grobaski, 46 F.2d 813. 814 (W.D.Mich. 1931); Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records. Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Shaff, 240. F. Supp. 588, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modifted on other
grounds. 352 F.2d 285 (1965). See also Pickford Corp. v. Deluxe Laboratories, Inc.. 169 F.
Supp. 118 (S.D.Cal. 1958) (infringement action barred by California two-year tort statute of
limitations). Despite this general rule, there are apparently no American cases reported
which analogize an indirect copyright infringement to the tort of conversion.
68. 146 F.2d at 413 (Hand, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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to affect the chattel. . . The intent required is not necessarily a matter
of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an intent to exercise dominion over
the goods... -"69
It was clear to Hand that to complete the analogy of conversion to
the case of an innocent indirect infringement, the infringing work and
the appropriated work must be viewed as "separate chattels," the in-
fringing work "embodying" the copyrighted work. In De,4costa, Hand
contended that the defendant publisher neither intended to affect the
plaintiffs copyrighted work embodied with the excerpt published; nor
did he have reason to suspect that the excerpt contained protected ma-
terial. Therefore, the defendant did not "convert" the copyrighted
work and damages should not have been awarded.
Hand's analysis is easily transposable to the case of the innocently
infringing record retailer, who, like the publisher, is also an indirect
infringer. When a retailer sells a record without knowledge or reason
to suspect that it contains a pirated recording, the retailer does not have
the intent necessary to convert and therefore should not be liable for
actual damages.
The British Copyright Act of 1956, as we shall discuss later, does
not actually adopt Hand's approach but arrives at the same result. The
1956 Act would hold the innocently infringing record retailer liable in
conversion for the sale of counterfeit records, but would not allow re-
covery of damages against him.
D. The Strict Liability Rationale
In response to the Latman and Tager study, Professor Nimmer, in
1958, submitted a letter to the Copyright Office outlining his position
on innocent infringement.70 His position has since become known as
69. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 83 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added). Accord. Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal.2d 541, 550 (1946) ("To establish a conversion.
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and
to exercise ownership over them .. "); Lambros Seaplane Base, Inc. v. The Batory, 117 F.
Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Kaufman, J.), mod6edon other grounds, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1954) (held, that conversion requires "an intention to assert a right . . . which is. in fact.
adverse to that of the owner"); Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 707, 324 P.2d 130, 134
(1958) ("The intention required is simply an intent to use or dispose of the goods .. ");
McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 526, 218 A.2d 408, 419 (1966) a d, 95 N.J. Super.
412. 231 A.2d 386 (1967) (held. that "an intent to convert consummated by some positive act
is necessary to constitute.conversion. ... )  "Conversion is an intentional exercise of do-
minion or control over a chattel .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
70. Letter from Melville B. Nimmer to Copyright Office (June 16, 1958) [hereinafter
cited as Nimmer's Letter], Latman, supra note 1, at 169.
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the "strict liability" approach to innocent infringement.7 In his letter,
Nimmer offered three arguments for shifting the copyright owner's risk
of loss to the innocent infringer.72 He contended that the innocent in-
fringer, unlike the copyright owner, is (1) able to prevent the infringe-
ment by making diligent inquiry, (2) able to obtain an indemnity
agreement from his supplier, or (3) able to secure insurance.
In his defense of the availability of actual damages against the in-
nocent infringer, Nimmer discounts three significant considerations:
(1) the individual differences in the ability of each indirect infringer to
prevent an infringement by making inquiry or obtaining indemnity or
insurance, (2) the relative abilities of each class of indirect infringer to
guard against an infringement by the three suggested means, and (3)
social, economic, or technological developments that may hamper the
ability of an indirect infringer to guard against the infringement.
The application of Nimmer's three-fold rationale to record retail-
ers will demonstrate the unfairness of his approach. Of all indirect in-
fringers, the record retailer is perhaps least capable of protecting
himself by making inquiry or by obtaining indemnity or insurance.
1. Diligent inquiry is no longer as effective in preventing counterfeit
sales.
When Nimmer submitted his letter to the Copyright Office in
1958, record piracy was a makeshift enterprise. Pirated product was
usually poorly recorded and shoddily packaged. The suspicious ap-
pearance of the "bootleg" recording is reported in the 1963 case of Sha-
piro, Bernstein & Co. v. H L. Green Co.73 In holding a department
store chain vicariously liable for the sale of bootleg records by a store
concessionaire, the Second Circuit observed that "the 'bootleg' record-
ings were somewhat suspicious on their face; they bore no name of any
manufacturer upon the labels or on the record jackets ... "'
The alerting cover of a bootleg record prevented its mass circula-
tion through the legal chain of distribution. The pirate was usually
compelled to sell his crude merchandise to flea-markets or to other yen-
71. 316 F.2d at 308.
72. The text of Nimmer's letter is in pertinent part the following: "It is my view that
basic to the problem of innocent infringement must be the underlying premise that as be.
tween two innocent parties (i.e., the copyright owner and the infringer), it is the innocent
infringer who must suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity to
guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the ability to guard against
the infringement (by an indemnity agreement from his supplier and/or by insurance)."
73. 316 F.2d 304 (1963).
74. Id. at 309 (Kaufman, J.) (emphasis added).
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dors outside of the conventional mainstream. If the pirate wished to
sell his goods directly to a legitimate retailer, it was incumbent upon
the pirate to be sure that his buyer was a willing accomplice. Some-
times the pirate would even solicit a business associate. For example,
in the 1956 case of Miller v. Goody," the trial court observed that the
defendant record dealers "had been acquainted with Mr. Krug [co-de-
fendant] in his capacity as a record salesman for the Colony Record &
Radio Center, but both assert that they found nothing surprising or
suspicious when it appeared that he was also in the business of manu-
facturing records under his own label.
76
During the "bootleg period," if a record pirate offered a shipment
of illegal merchandise to an honest retailer, the retailer was usually put
on notice to make diligent inquiry by the suspicious appearance of the
bootleg cover or by the solicitous behavior of the pirate. An immediate
inquiry by the retailer would probably settle any doubt in his mind that
the records were infringing.
But the entire thrust of record piracy has changed. Piracy is no
longer a sporadic and imprecise endeavor; rather, it is a pervasive and
exacting practice commonly believed to be associated with organized
crime. The modem counterfeiter's object is to saturate the retail mar-
ket with letter-perfect copies of legal records. The new sophistication
of record piracy is reflected in the deceptiveness of the illegal product.
In many cases, the artwork of a legal record is reproduced photographi-
cally. And nearly perfect sound quality is attainable by acquiring the
"master stamp" used by record companies to manufacture legal prod-
uct.
Admissions by record company executives indicate that their in-
vestigators frequently find it impossible to detect counterfeit records.
Joseph Smith, chairman of the board of Elektra/Asylum/Nonesuch
Records has reported that "[ciounterfeiting of records and tapes is get-
ting to be big business. They aren't playing games now. These things
are damn good qualiy. It's hard to tell the imitations even when they
come back to us as returns."77 Gary Davis, senior vice president of
promotion at Motown Records is even more candid. He is quoted as
saying that some counterfeiters "[h]ave facilities and recording studios
more sophisticated than some legitimate firms. They steal the master of
a record and press their own version, duplicate the cover from top to
75. 139 F. Supp. 176 (1956), re ldsub nom. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody. 248 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1957).
76. 139 F. Supp. at 178 (Kaufman, J.).
77. TIME, March 10, 1980, at 70 (emphasis added).
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bottom, sell the goods to distributors and record stores-andyou can't
tell the dfferencefrom the authorized release. And we often can't tell the
dfference, either, when the unsold records are returned to us. . . 7
Record companies are in a better position than record retailers to
determine whether their releases have been printed. If record compa-
nies cannot identify counterfeit product, retailers would have even
greater difficulty detecting it. Therefore, unlike the conditions of 1958,
the physical appearance of a counterfeit record may not trigger the re-
tailer's inquiry into possible wrongdoing.
Moreover, in contrast to 1958 practice, the deceptive quality of the
new generation of counterfeit records allows the pirate to penetrate the
retail market without selling directly to retailers. Modern counterfeit-
ing is most profitable if the pirate sells to willing wholesalers and other
independent distributors, who can in turn resell the pirated product to
the scores of retailers who purchase from independent suppliers.7 9 The
counterfeit records may be transferred two or three times before their
ultimate purchase by the retailer. One commentator describes the in-
termediate sources available to the retailer: "The 'rack jobber', as com-
monly understood, services supermarkets, variety stores, drug stores,
and other busy retail outlets, whereas the 'one-stop' stocks the records
of many manufacturers so that jukebox operators and small dealers can
purchase their requirements at one location instead of having to con-
tact a number of distributors." 80
From the retailer's point of view, the diffusion of counterfeit
records throughout the network of legal distribution is a vastly greater
danger than the former practice of "bootleg peddling." The retailer
may never deal directly with an overly solicitous pirate or with any
suspicious individual. It is more likely that the retailer would be ap-
proached with counterfeit product by his regular supplier, who has
himself unwittingly purchased the records. If the album covers appear
authentic and the supplier's suspicion is not aroused, the retailer may
have no reason to make inquiry of his supplier.
Finally, the inability of a retailer to make effective inquiry is
demonstrated by the record company admissions we noted earlier, 8
which indicate that record companies themselves are frequently unable
78. Daily Breeze (Torrance, Cal. newspaper), May 8, 1980 at 8 (emphasis added).
79. See distribution charts taken from BILLBOARD, in SHEMEL. supra note 22, at xxiii-
xxvii.
80. Id. at 104 (quotation marks added).
81. Notes 77 and 78 supra and accompanying text.
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to distinguish between counterfeit and legal returns. "Returns," in rec-
ord industry parlance, consist of all unsold merchandise, defective or
otherwise, which is returned to the manufacturer by distributors and
retailers for credit. The policy of the record companies is to re-dis-
tribute non-defective returns, rather than to destroy them. 2 It follows
that if counterfeit returns are not detected by the record companies,
they may be recycled to distributors and retailers. Under these condi-
tions, no amount of supplier screening or inquiry could prevent in-
fringements.
Diligent inquiry is no longer the potent deterrent that it was in
1958. In light of the current piracy sophistication, the relevant policy
question is no longer who is in a better position to make diligent in-
quiry, but perhaps, who is in a better position to make counterfeit
records detectable? There is no doubt that the immediate step to be
taken in preventing indirect infringements is largely a matter of tech-
nology. If record companies can invent a counterfeit detection device
and make it available to retailers, perhaps many infringing sales could
be prevented.
But such a new policy based on comparative abilities to invent a
detection device is as perilous as Nimmer's 1958 "diligent inquiry" ar-
gument. The practicalities which presuppose each policy can change as
record piracy continues to evolve. In 1985, record companies might
claim that counterfeiters have frustrated the new policy by duplicating
some new detection device.
The British Copyright Act of 1956 offers an innovative case-by-
case approach to indirect infringement that is not dependent on, but
instead incorporates, the state of the record piracy art. Under the 1956
Act, a seller of infringing records is not liable for damages unless he
has reason to suspect that the records infringe. In determining whether
the seller has reason to suspect, the Act would probably take into ac-
count factors such as whether the retailer was compelled as a practical
matter to deal directly with an independent supplier rather than with
the manufacturer; whether the retailer did in fact make diligent in-
quiry, whether the counterfeit records were undetectable upon sensory
inspection, and whether the retailer had access to a detection device.
Under the 1956 Act, the state of the record piracy art does not deter-
mine who shall bear the copyright owner's losses from counterfeit sales.
82. Interview with Shirish Contractor, Director of Royalties of Capitol Records, Inc.
(April 9, 1980).
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2. Indemnity agreements are not a trade custom among record retail-
ers.
Nimmer's second policy argument for making actual damages
available against the innocent infringer is that the infringer, unlike the
copyright owner, is able to obtain indemnity from his supplier. This
argument may be valid theoretically, but in practice it is not. The argu-
ment disregards the fact that the availability of indemnity agreements
to any class of indirect infringer is influenced by existing trade customs
of the class. The policy also fails to consider individual differences of
ability to obtain indemnity, due to varying types of distributors that
serve a given community. The "indemnity" argument is especially ar-
bitrary when applied to record retailers, for whom indemnity is not a
custom of the trade.
In 1958, Professor Brown pointed out, in what appears to be the
only contemporary survey on the availability of indemnity and insur-
ance to infringers,83 that the practical ability of any infringer to obtain
indemnity is largely dependent on the custom of his trade. Brown
identifies the classes of infringer that make use of indemnity agree-
ments:
[I]ndemnities are elaborately developed in the complex of re-
lationships among advertising agencies, producers of pro-
grams, licensors of musical performing rights, and
broadcasters. . . . Magazine publishers, it appears routinely
require indemnity from agencies and advertisers with respect
to materials supplied by them. . . In the book publishing
world . . . resort to the author depends on the relationship
between him and the publisher. . . . Sometimes authors are
expected to pay- sometimes they are not.84
In 1958, it was not customary for record retailers to obtain indem-
nification from their distributors. In contrast to those professions in
which indemnity agreements were "elaborately developed," indemnity
in a standardized form was simply not available to record retailers.
This condition exists to this day.
5
83. R.S. Brown, Jr., The Operation of the Damages Provisions of the Copyright Law,
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, No. 23, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [herein-
after cited as Brown].
84. Id. at 86-88.
85. NARM Counsel Charles B. Ruttenberg claims that record retailers "may wish to
seek" indemnity. He recent mailed a simple one page indemnity agreement to NARM
members as a sample. Letter from Charles B. Ruttenberg to NARM members 13 (May 14,
1980).
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3. Insurance against infringement is not available to record retailers.
In his third argument, Nimmer claims that unlike the copyright
owner, the innocent infringer is in a position to obtain insurance. The-
oretically, copyright owners may obtain insurance as well as innocent
infringers if they are willing to pay very high premiums. However, the
argument discriminates against those infringers who cannot afford an
exorbitant premium. Moreover, the "insurance" rationale is fallacious
in application: the practical availability of insurance is largely depen-
dent on trends in the insurance field: some classes of infringer are more
insurable than others.
When the "insurance" rationale is applied to record retailers, par-
ticular hardship results. Insurers have traditionally been reluctant to
protect record companies or retailers against the risk of counterfeit
sales. The reason is that carriers would not be insuring against a less
than probable risk, but against an almost certain and calculable busi-
ness loss.86 For such insurance to be profitable for the carrier, the pol-
icy would have to contain a number of intricate exceptions, and the
cost of the policy would be prohibitive. To this day, carriers do not
seriously entertain the notion of insuring against counterfeit sales.87
Professor Brown provides us with an overview of the contempo-
rary trend of the insurance field in protecting various classes of in-
fringer. He indicates that carriers do not insure record retailers against
counterfeit sales: "The industries which make extensive use of. . . in-
surance protection are about the same as those which have thoroughly
systematized the use of indemnity agreements: broadcasters, producers
for broadcasting, advertising agencies, advertisers. However, the insur-
ance seems to be little used in the music feld . . . 8
4. Reappraisal of the strict liability approach: A defense of innocence
should be available to all indirect infringers.
The foregoing points up the weakness of the strict liability ration-
ale for making actual damages available against the innocent infringer
by applying it to the record retailer, an infringer who has particular
difficulty guarding against an infringement by Nimmer's three sug-
gested means. However, the inability of record retailers to make an
86. Interview with Donna Carson, Account Executive of Marsh & McLennan (August
12, 1980).
87. The two insurance carriers which write most of the entertainment policies in the
western United States, American National General Agencies and Albert G. Ruben & Com-
pany, have never written such a policy and deny that such a policy exists.
88. Brown, supra note 83, at 88.
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effective -inquiry or to obtain loss protection is a temporal condition.
Ten years from now the record retailer may be in better position than
other classes of infringer to guard against an infringement. Ultimately,
the strict liability approach operates harshly against all indirect infring-
ers.
On what ground may the unfair impact of the strict liability ap-
proach be justified? Nimmer suggests that "to render a complete or
partial exemption for the innocent infringer would seriously impair the
protection afforded to a copyright owner."' 9 Yet, Nimmer fails to ex-
plain how seriously a remedial defense in which the infringer would
bear the burden of proving his innocence would impair the copyright
owner's monopoly.
E The First Amendment Problem
The first stirrings of a conflict between the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment appeared to emerge during the Congressional
hearings on the passage of the 1909 Act. Congress debated whether
actual damages should be available against the innocently infringing
printer. George W. Ogilvie, a Chicago publisher, offered testimony
which suggests that the availability of damages against the innocently
infringing printer contravenes the First Amendment freedom of the
press:
There is no printer in the United States whom I cannot get in
trouble-serious trouble-so serious that it might put him out
of business. I take to him a set of plates about which he
knows nothing as to the existence of copyright on them. He
prints them for me. . . and then the owners of the copyright
can get after him and collect damages.90
Mr. Ogilvie's admonition went unheeded. With the passage of the
1909 Act, not only was the printer denied the protection available to
the seller under the 1870 Act, but the seller's protection disappeared as
well. The First Amendment was not seriously viewed at the time as
limiting the scope of the Copyright Clause.
Proponents of special treatment for innocent infringers appeared
to base their position on the language of the Copyright Clause itself,
rather than on the First Amendment. The House Report of the 1909
Act states that "[i]n enacting a copyright law, Congress must consider
. . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the
producer and so benefit the public; and [s]econd, how much will the mo-
89. Nimmer's Letter, supra note 80 (emphasis added).
90. Latman, supra note 1, at 145.
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nopoly granted be detrimental to the public."9' The Copyright Clause
does on its face suggest that the purpose of securing exclusive rights for
authors and inventors is "[t]o promote the progress of science and usa-
ble arts." And the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the
primary object of conferring a monopoly on authors and inventors is to
benefit the public.92 However, the apparent words of limitation within
the Clause have never been viewed by the Court as providing protec-
tion for innocent infringers.
It was not until De4costa v. Brown in 1944 that a federal court
discussed the First Amendment problem inherent in making actual
damages available against the innocent indirect infringer. In holding
an innocently infringing publisher liable for actual damages, the Sec-
ond Circuit majority claimed that such an award "would hardly make
an appreciable difference to publishers in the conduct of their busi-
ness. .... 93
In dissent, Judge Hand vigorously argued that the liability of the
defendant publisher for actual damages, though they were unsubstan-
tial, amounted to an unjustifiable burden on the First Amendment:
[W]e are, in my opinion, committing ourselves to a doctrine
which is wrong in theory, which the cases do not require us to
adopt, and which imposes a risk upon publishers that is likely
to prove an appreciable and very undesirable burden upon the
freedom of the press. . . . If my brothers are right, a pub-
lisher must be prepared to respond in damages to any author
who can prove that the publisher has incorporated, however
innocently, and at whatever remove, any parts of the author's
work. If that possibility is to hover over all publications, it
would, I believe, be not a negligible depressant upon the dissemi-
nation of knowledge.
More recently, Nimmer has supported Hand's view, though not
necessarily in contradiction with his strict liability approach to inno-
91. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
92. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (Douglas, J.)
("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors"). Accord, Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts' ").
93. 146 F.2d 408, 412.
94. Id. at 412-13 (Hand, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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cent infringement, that the Copyright Clause is limited by the First
Amendment. According to Nimmer:
It might be contended that copyright law falls within a built-in
exception to First Amendment protection. . . if a completely
liberal reading of the First Amendment is to be made, then we
must. . . recognize that the First Amendment is an amend-
ment, hence superceding anything inconsistent with it which
may be found in the main body of the Constitution. This, of
course includes the Copyright Clause."
The increasing body of literature96 and case law97 recognizing a
tension between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment sug-
gests that Hand correctly identified the conflicting interests in De
Acosta. Although Hand did not broaden the scope of his opinion to
include First Amendment protection for other indirect infringers, it ap-
pears logical that his analysis would extend to printers, vendors and
others who are closely involved in the "dissemination of knowledge."
V. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT INFRINGERS
UNDER BRITISH LAW
In sixteenth century England, copyright, as an instrument of the
Crown, was employed to rigorously censor all printed matter that of-
fended the Church. Under Henry VIII's Stationers' Company, which
was formed in 1556, and the subsequent licensing acts, an author could
not publish a book without obtaining a government license.9" But as
95. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 1.10[A] (emphasis added). However, the type ofjudicial
review that is applicable to conflicts between the Copyright Clause and the First Amend-
ment has not as yet been determined. 1d. In testing First Amendment constraints on federal
legislation, the United States Supreme Court has employed a balancing test. See American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) (Vinson, C.J.) ("When particular
conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of
these two conflicting interests demands the greatest protection under the particular circum-
stances presented").
96. E.g., Note, Copyright and the First Amendment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 207 (1978);
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983 (1970); Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First 4mendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); Nimmer, Copyright and the First Amendment, 17 BULL. COP-
YRIGHT Soc'y 255 (1970).
97. E.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 116 (N.D.Cal. 1972), modi-
fied on other grounds, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) ("the
First Amendment does mark out some boundary for the protection that may be afforded a
creator under the copyright laws. .")
98. See R.R. BowKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 21 (1912) [hereinafter
cited as BOWKER] and L.R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 29 (1968).
Failure to comply with the strict regulations of the Stationers' Company could result in
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the eighteenth century began, the licensing acts "lapsed because of the
indignation of the Commons against the arbitrary power of the li-
cense. ....
The Statute of Anne,' enacted by Parliament in 1710, was a di-
rect response to the government's suppression of heretical books and
pamphlets. The celebrated Statute not only rewarded authors for their
creative labor, but also protected innocent indirect infringers. The
wording and substance of the innocent infringer provision was almost
identical to that of the 1790 Act adopted by Congress.' 0'
However, the innocent infringer provision of the Statute also con-
tained the deficiencies embodied in the 1790 Act. As in the 1790 Act,
the Statute's implementation of safeguards for innocent indirect in-
fringers was inconsistent. Publishers and vendors were protected, but
printers and importers were not. Also, Parliament offered absolute im-
munity to those innocent infringers who were protected, namely pub-
lishers and vendors, making it impossible for copyright owners to
obtain forfeiture or injunctive relief against them.
The British Copyright Act of 1842102 (1842 Act) continued the in-
consistent application of safeguards to innocent indirect infringers, as
well as the policy of absolute immunity for those protected.
The British Copyright Act of 1911103 (1911 Act) remedied the
problems of absolute immunity and inconsistent treatment of innocent
harsh punishment. As one legal historian reports: "The author under such conditions was a
very different creature from his modem successor. As has been wittily said, in early days, an
author usually disappeared immediately after the publication of his work and if he reap-
peared at all, did so in the stocks or pillory. To talk about the rights of authors in Tudor or
Stuart England, would have been farcical. The early history of copyright had nothing to do
with the rights of the author." A. WElL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-7 (1917).
99. BOWKER, supra note 98. at 21-22.
100. 8 Anne, c. 19. For an excellent overview of the Statute, see generally, H. RANSOM,
THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956).
101. The Statute made available forfeiture and damages to copyright owners "if any...
bookseller, printer, or other person. . . shall print, reprint, or import, or cause to be printed,
reprinted, or imported, any (copyrighted] book or books, without the consent of the proprie-
tor. . . or knowing the same to be so printed or reprinted without the consent of the proprie-
tors, shall sell, publish, or exposefor sale .. any such book or books...." (emphasis
added).
102. 5 & 6 Vict., c.45. The British Copyright Act of 1842 provided that "[i]f any person
shall. . . print or cause to be printed, either for sale or exportation, any book in which there
shall be subsisting copyright, without the consent in writing of the proprietor thereof, or
shall import for sale or hire any such book so having been unlawfully printed. . . or, know-
ing such book to have been so unlawfullyprinted or imported, shall sell, publish, or expose/or
sale or hire. . . any such book so unlawfully printed or imported. . . such offender shall be
liable. ... 5 & 6 Vict., c.45, § 15 (emphasis added).
103. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.46.
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indirect infringers. The 1911 Act insulated such infringers from in-
fringement liability, but would hold them liable for a conversion. The
broad wording of Section 2(2) appeared to protect vendors, printers,
publishers, and importers from infringement liability if they were inno-
cent:
Copyright in a work shall. . . be deemed to be infringed by
any person who--(a) sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade
exposes or offers for sale or hire; or (b) distributes either for
the purposes of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudi-
cially the owner of the copyright; or (c) by way of trade exhib-
its in public; or (d) imports for sale or hire ...any word
which to his knowledge infringes copyright. ... 104
However, under Section 7,105 which provided the copyright owner
with a cause of action in conversion, the indirect infringer's intent was
irrelevant in establishing the conversion. As Lord Justice Romer stated
in Sutherland Publishing Co. v. Caxton Publishing Co. , o6 "[I]f a person
who has not himself infringed the copyright . ..innocently sells, or
exposes, or offers for sale, an infringing work, he does not thereby com-
mit an infringement of copyright. . . however, by virtue of section 7
... the owner of the copyright . . . could take proceedings . .. in
respect of any conversion thereof."'' 0 7
The above excerpt illustrates an important difference in the Ameri-
can and British law of conversion. Although the British law is in agree-
ment with the American view that there must be "an intention on the
part of the defendant. . . to deny the owner's right or to assert a right
which is inconsistent with the owner's right. .. "'08 there is a general
exception under British law--"intention is immaterial in cases where a
man deals with goods as his own."' °9 In a typical British case of inno-
cent indirect infringement, the common law exception dispensing with
an intent to convert would be controlling. In Sutherland, "I book pub-
104. Id. § 2(2) (emphasis added).
105. i & 2 Geo. 5, c.46, § 7 provided that "[ajll infringing copies of any work in which
copyright subsists, or of any substantial part thereof, and all plates used or intended to be
used for the production of such infringing copies, shall be deemed to be the property of the
owner of the copyright, who accordingly may take proceedings for the recovery of the pos-
session thereof or in respect of the conversion thereof."
106. (19371 4 All E.R. 405 (C.A.).
107. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
108. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. MacNicoll [19181 88 L.J. K.B. 601, 605 (Atkin,
J.).
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lishers who innocently infringed by binding together portions of a
copyrighted work into their book were held liable for a conversion,
though their act "was in fact an unconscious conversion.""'I
The establishment of a conversion under Section 7 could not result
in a cumulative award of actual damages and profits. The traditional
British view is that an account of profits is alternative to an award of
damages.' 12 Nonetheless, at his election, the copyright owner could ob-
tain actual damages against the innocent indirect infringer for the con-
version, after he had exhausted the possibility of obtaining damages
and profits for the infringement.
The inconsistency of Sections 2(2) and 7 was highlighted by the
fact that, under certain circumstances, damages flowing from a conver-
sion could be greater than those resulting from the infringement. If the
infringer was innocent, the immunity granted by Section 2(2) would be
destroyed. The Court of Appeal, in Sutherland, mentioned that the
publishers "may have reproduced a very few copies of high intrinsic
value, which amounts to much more than the damage done to the cop-
yright, which may be almost negligible." '" 3 Because under British law
the measure of damages for the conversion is the value of the copies,
rather than the depreciation of the value of the copyright," t4 the copy-
right owner could conceivably recover more for the conversion than for
the infringement.
VI. TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT INFRINGERS
UNDER THE 1956 ACT
A. Generally
The British Copyright Act of 1956' '1 (1956 Act) was the first Brit-
ish copyright statute to altogether eliminate the availability of damages
against the innocent indirect infringer. In effect, the 1956 Act adopts
the approach suggested in the introduction: the copyright owner can
obtain only injunctive relief and profits against the innocent indirect
11. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 401.
113. [19361 1 All E.R. 177, 181 (C.A.) (Lord Wright, M.R.).
114. Id. at 180.
115. The 1956 Act is reprinted with annotations in J.P. EDDY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
(1957). The 1956 Act and its predecessor are reprinted without annotations in COPINGER,
supra note 4, at App. A. Other secondary sources on the 1956 Act, in addition to those
already cited, include T. BLANCO WHITE, R. JACOB, AND J. DAVIES, PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, COPYRIGHT, AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS (1978); W.S. LEAPER, COPYRIGHT AND
PERFORMING ARTS (1957); and P.F. CARTER-RUCK AND E.P. SKONE JAMES, CO.PYRIGHT:
MODERN LAW AND PRACTICE (1965).
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infringer. Parliament accomplished this result by reworking the bifur-
cated infringement and conversion scheme of the 1911 Act.
The 1956 Act continues the approach of Section 2(2) of the 1911
Act insulating innocent indirect infringers of copyrighted works from
all infringement liability, and in addition provides infringement immu-
nity to innocent indirect infringers of protected sound recordings." 1
6
But Parliament resolved the inconsistency between Sections 2(2)
and 7 of the former Act by removing the availability of damages
against the innocent indirect infringer under the head of conversion.
This modification of former Section 7 amounts to a legislative redefin-
ing of conversion as applied to the copyright field. The 1911 Act per-
mitted the copyright owner to obtain damages in conversion against the
innocent indirect infringer due to an exception at common law which
dispensed with the requirement of intent to convert. Under section
18(2) of the 1956 Act, the innocent indirect infringer may still be liable
for a conversion, but damages cannot be imposed.
Section 18(2) provides as follows:
A plaintiff shall not be entitled. . . to any damages or to any
other pecuniary remedy (except costs) if it is proved or admit-
ted that, at the time of the conversion or detention in question
. . . where the articles converted or detained were infringing
copies, the defendant believed, and had reasonable grounds/or
believing, that they were not infringing copies. .... I
The net effect of Section 18(2) is that a copyright owner can obtain
an injunction and an account of profits against an innocent indirect
infringer, but not damages. The British view an account of profits not
116. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 5(2) provides that a copyright in a "literary, dramatic, musical
or artistic work is infringed by any person who, without the license of the owner of the
copyright, imports an article (otherwise than for his private and domestic use) into the
United Kingdom. . . if to his knowledge the making of that article constituted an infringe-
ment of that copyright, or would have constituted such an infringement if the article had
been made in the place into which it is so imported." 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 5(3) provides that
a "copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by any person who,
in the United Kingdom. . . and without the license of the owner of the copyright,-(a) sells,
lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire any article, or (b) by way of
trade exhibits any article in public, if to his knowledge the making of the article constituted
an infringement of that copyright, or (in the case of an imported article) would have consti-
tuted an infringement of that copyright if the article had been made in the place into which
it was imported." 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 5(4) provides that "[t]he last preceding subsection
shall apply in relation to the distribution of any articles either-(a) for purposes of trade, or
(b) for other purposes, but to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copy-
right in question, as it applies in relation to the sale of an article." The provisions of § 5(2)-
(4) are restated in § 16(2)-(4), but with respect to sound recordings.
117. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74, § 18(2)(b) (emphasis added).
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as a "pecuniary remedy," but as an equitable remedy ancillary to an
injunction.' 8
B. Liabiity of Innocently Infringing Record Retailers
Under Section 504 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976, a
copyright owner may recover actual damages against the innocently
infringing record retailer in one of two ways: by election of actual
damages and profits or by submitting the determination of statutory
damages to the court's broad discretion. The infringer's innocence may
be a factor in the court's assessment of statutory damages or it may be
ignored, but his innocence does not necessarily result in any special
treatment.
Unlike the 1976 Act, Section 18(2) of the 1956 Act offers infringing
retailers an unequivocal opportunity to avoid payment of actual dam-
ages. Section 18(2) clearly instructs the courts that damages are not
available against an infringing retailer if he can establish his inno-
cence.1 9 In arriving at a finding of innocence, the British courts could
probably consider such factors as whether the counterfeit records were
highly deceptive, whether the retailer had reason to suspect his supplier
of illegal activity, and whether the legal manufacturer had made avail-
able to the retailer a counterfeit detection device.
The current wave of record piracy in Great Britain has fueled a
controversy as to whether the bar against the recovery of damages from
the innocently infringing record retailer should be eliminated. The
British recording industry, like its American counterpart, is angered by
lost sales due to the infiltration of pirated records into the retail market.
It is estimated that counterfeiting operations are largely responsible for
a "drop in album sales of over 25%.
' 120
118. See, e.g., WEA Records Ltd. v. Benson King [19741 3 All E.R. 81 (Ch.); Price's
Patent Candle Co. v. Bauwen's Patent Candle Co. [1858] 4 K. & J. 727, 7 Eng. Rep. 302;
Smith v. London & South W. Ry. [ 1854] Kay 408, 69 Eng. Rep. 173; Baily v. Taylor [1829] 1
Russ. & M. 73, 39 Eng. Rep. 28 (Ch.). However, injunctive relief and damages may be
cumulatively granted. See, e.g., Leeds Indus. Coop. Soc'y v. Slack [1924] All E.R. 259
(H.L.); Serrao v. Noel (1885] 15 Q.B.D. 549 (C.A.); Elmore v. Pirrie [1887] 57 L.T.R. 333
(Ch.).
119. See Young v. Odeon Music House Pty. Ltd. [1978) R.P.C. 621 (Supr. Ct. N.S.W.)
(held, per Australian copyright statute, innocently infringing record retailer was not liable
for actual damages).
120. HoLLYWOOD REPORTER, October 16, 1979, at 11. This trade publication suggests
that the fiscal problems of the British recording industry are highlighted by the financial
performance of Electric & Musical Industries Limited for the 1978-79 year: "The group's
record division suffered a sharp decline, moving from a $34-million loss in the second half,
leaving a profit of just $4 million for the full year on sales of $900 million." Id.
LOYOL-. ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL.
However, it appears that the containment of record piracy will not
require the excision of the remedial defense- of innocence that is pres-
ently available to record retailers. In 1977, the British Copyright Coun-
cil and the British Phonographic Industry Copyright Association urged
the Whitford Committee, 121 which had convened to consider a revision
of the 1956 Act, to recommend to Parliament that safeguards for inno-
cently infringing record vendors be abolished in order to stop the
"growing pattern of illicit importation into and distribution"'22 of
counterfeit records in Great Britain. The Whitford Committee, how-
ever, arrived at a different conclusion: "[Clare must be taken to ensure
that the interests of defendants who are wholly innocent are adequately
protected. . . . [W]e are of the opinion that there should continue to be
some provision in the Act for a defense based on innocence.. "123
VIII. CONCLUSION
This weaving of the historical problem of innocent infringement
into the context of modem record piracy is intended to stimulate a
Congressional reevaluation of the treatment accorded all innocent indi-
rect infringers under the 1976 Act.
Professor Ball once wrote that the United States copyright law
contemplates "the extension and increasing adaptation of the copyright
laws to the uses of society. in accordance with changing conditions."' 24
As we have shown, the rigid strict liability approach of the 1976 Act
toward innocent infringers is out of step with this mandate. The Act
fails to give sufficient weight to technological advances that may hinder
the infringer's ability to make an effective inquiry, trade customs that
may affect his ability to obtain indemnity, and business trends that may
make insurance unavailable.
In contrast, Britain's 1956 Act permits a case-by-case adjudication
of each indirect infringer's innocence. The individualized approach of
the 1956 Act gives the courts power to create a body of common law
defining what constitutes "innocence" for each class of. indirect in-
fringer, which can then be applied in particular cases. The standard of
121. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE LAW ON COPYRIGHTS AND DE-
SIGNS, CMND. No. 6732 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Whitford Committee]. For an over-
view of the Whitford Committee's findings, see Toward a New British Copyright Law, 121
Solicitor's J. 584 (1977).
122. Whitford Committee, supra note 121, at § 735.
123. Id. at § 737 (emphasis added).
124. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 7, at 44 (1944).
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innocence for each class will fluctuate in accordance with changing so-
cial, economic, and technological circumstances.
A Congressional realignment of protections afforded copyright
owners and innocent infringers would not necessarily require an adop-
tion of the British bifurcated scheme of infringement and conversion,
together with its remedial ramifications. Congress may provide ade-
quate protection for innocent infringers by making available a reme-
dial defense to infringement based on innocence. Such a defense
would be determinative of the availability of actual damages against all
innocent indirect infringers, whether the copyright owner elects actual
damages and profits or statutory damages, and would be less ambigu-
ous and less subject to discriminatory application than the present op-
eration of Section 504. Moreover, the remedial defense would not
require a set of doubtful public policy arguments to justify it and would
lessen potential First Amendment problems.
Frank L. Fine

